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Lucas: Hospital-Physician Relationships

THE SERVICE'S LATEST ATTEMPT To REGULATE
HOSPITAL-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIPS:

A C RITICAL ANALYSIS
by
PATRICK H. LUCAS*

INTRODUCTION
In November of 1991, Chief of Counsel (the "Chief Counsel") of the
exempt organization division of the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service" or
"IRS") issued its latest in a series of rulings intended to restrict tax-exempt
hospitals' practices in recruiting or retaining physicians. I The most recent ruling,
General Counsel Memorandum ("GCM") 39,862 expands upon prior rulings
issued by the Chief Counsel. These "GCMs" represent the legal advice given by
the Chief Counsel to the IRS. Although such GCMs are not binding upon the IRS
or any taxpayer, a lack of published rulings and court decisions dealing with
increasingly more complex hospital-physician relationships has made these GCMs
uniquely important to tax-exempt hospitals in structuring their affairs.
Despite this importance, the failure of these legal interpretations to undergo
the rigors of the administrative process applicable to published rulings or the
critical examination of the courts must be considered. The most recent GCM and
all its predecessors have sound policy bases for their legal conclusions but each
lacks certain analytical support. Recent articles have discussed in detail this GCM,
the Chief Counsel's most recent interpretation. 2 However, these articles do not
attempt a detailed critical examination of the authority for the Service's positions set
forth in this GCM. This article is a search for the GCM's foundation and a
discussion of what that search reveals. Only after such critical examination can an
exempt hospital completely evaluate whether its current and future practices
endanger its exemption.
The principal purpose of GCM 39,862 was to review and reconsider three
private letter rulings issued in the 1980s. 3 The rulings approved the sales by
hospitals of revenue streams from the operation of departments of those hospitals
* Vanderbilt University, B.A. (1978), J.D. (1981); University of Florida, L.L.M. (1982); Associate,
Baker, Worthington, Crossley, Stansbery & Woolf, Knoxville, Tennessee.
1 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987);
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978).

2 See e.g., Peregrine and Broccolo, Health Care Joint Ventures After GCM 39862: The Chief Counsel's
Boarding House Reach, 4 ExEMPr ORGANIZATION TAX REV. 1309 (1991); Robert S. Bromberg, IRS Announces
New Position on Hospital-PhysicianJoint Ventures, 5 EXEMPT ORGANIZATION TA REV. 31 (1992); Richard
Lipton, IRS Attacks Hospital Joint Ventures, 70 TAXES 59 (1992).
3 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-20-093 (Feb. 26, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-42-099 (July 28, 1989); and an

unpublished 1984 Private Letter Ruling.
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to limited partnerships between the particular hospital as general partner and its
staff physicians as limited partners. The revenue streams generally had five-year
initial terms with five-year renewal periods. The price for the stream was
determined by discounting an appraised value of the future revenue streams to
present value using an appropriate discount rate. In each case the hospitals picked
facilities such as outpatient surgery departments which were experiencing
underutilization or other financial difficulty. By giving the physicians part of the
financial benefit of increased referrals the hospitals believed the transaction would
bring up utilization of those departments.
The Chief Counsel concluded in the GCM that each of these rulings should
be revoked for three reasons: (1) The transactions violated the proscription against
inurement of an exempt organization's earnings to any private individual; (2) the
transactions infringed upon the doctrine that an organization must operate for
public rather than private benefit in order to be exempt from the income tax; and
(3) the transactions may violate federal law and that such violations are inconsistent
with exemption from the income tax. Each of these theories is examined
separately in detail below. The examination is then accompanied by a critical
analysis of the Chief Counsel's interpretation of such doctrines in reaching his
conclusions.
PRIVATE INUREMENT
In General
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") proscribes the
inurement of any part of the net earnings of an exempt organization to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual. 4 Any inurement within the meaning
contemplated by the statute, however small, results in the loss of exemption. 5
There are two critical elements to the proscription: (1) the "inurement" of
earnings for (2) the benefit of a "private shareholder or individual." Both must be
present to apply the proscription. Neither of these elements has been easy to
define. With regard to the concept of "private individual," the regulations provide
that the term refers to persons who have a "personal and private interest" in the
organization. 6 This generally means the founders or controlling members of the
organization (i.e., officers or directors) who have a personal stake in the
organization's receipts. The proscription does not apply to unrelated third parties. 7
4

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1991).

5 Spokane Motorcycle Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Wash. 1963); Founding Church
of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Ci. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970).
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.501-1(a),(c) (1992).
7 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 391 (1984), affd, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
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Frequently, persons subject to the proscription are referred to as "insiders." 8
Officers, directors, founders, trustees, shareholders and the like are easy to identify
as "insiders" or "private shareholders or individuals" but the Service apparently
asserts that the term may also include anyone able to exert influence on the
organization with respect to the transaction allegedly giving rise to the inurement. 9
This concept is reasonable but the Service's application of it has produced some
questionable results. For example, the Service takes the position that all employees
"possess the requisite relationships necessary to find private inurement." 10 It has
been suggested that this position is not an absolute rule, but a presumption "that
employees as a class relate to an exempt organization in such a manner that
significant potential exists for inside influence." II The IRS has also taken the
position that newly recruited physicians of a tax-exempt hospital are subject to the
inurement proscription. 12
The issue of inurement has directly arisen in several court decisions
involving putatively tax-exempt hospitals. In all of those decisions involving
physicians who were either trustees/directors or officers of the hospital the courts
directly found that the net earnings of the organizations inured to the benefit of
such physicians. 13
In only one decision, however, has the inurement question been addressed in
the context of physicians having no or little governing authority over the hospital.
In Harding Hospital v. United States ,4 the Sixth Circuit stated that the subject
hospital's exemption should be revoked because the court could not conclude that a
nationally recognized psychiatric hospital was organized and operated exclusively
for exempt purposes 15 or that no part of its net earnings inured to the benefit of
private individuals. 16 The hospital had contracted with a physician group to
provide medical supervision in the hospital, teaching and supervising in the
hospital's residency and other training programs, and medical services to indigent

8 See BRUCE R. HoPKINS, THELAw OFTAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, § 12.2 (5th Ed. 1987); American
Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987); Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986).

10 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987).
11 T.J. Sullivan & V. Moore, A Critical Look at Recent Developments in Tax-Exempt Hospitals, 23 J.
HEALm & Hosp. LAw 65, 73 (1990).
12 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986).
13 See Lowry Hosp. Assoc. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 850 (1976); Maynard Hosp., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1006 (1969); Loraine Ave. Clinic v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 141 (1958). In Sonora
Community Hosp. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 519 (1966), affd, 397 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1968), the facts in
the opinion do not indicate officer or director status of founding physicians, but one 'such founder's wife
was the hospital administrator.
14 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974).
15 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), among other things, also provides that an organization may not be exempt,
unless it is operated exclusively for exempt purposes.
16 HardingHosp., Inc., 505 F.2d at 1077.
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patients without a charge or at a reduced rate. 17 The group performed all
psychiatric treatment on ninety to ninety-five percent of the patients admitted to the
hospital. 18 A majority of the board of directors of the hospital, however, was not
connected to the physician group. 19
Although the decision does not establish a test for determining when
physicians are deemed "insiders," it does give some indication of when staff
physicians at an independently governed hospital will acquire such status. The
factors important to the decision were the day to day supervision of the hospital's
activities by a small group of physicians and attribution of substantially all of the
hospital's revenue to such group. 20 These factors fall far short of the Service's bold
assertion that all staff physicians, no matter what amount of hospital revenue they
control and no matter what degree of management supervision they possess,
constitute "insiders."
Because of the Service's all-consuming view of what constitutes a
"physician insider" and because no court decisions have specifically rejected this
view, the second element - the inurement of earnings - must also be examined
in the context of hospital-physician transactions. As is often stated, "Earnings may
inure to an individual in ways other than through the distribution of dividends." 21
Basically, the inurement proscription "means that a[n insider] cannot pocket the
organization's funds except as reasonable payment for goods or services." 2 Thus,
the bottom line for determining whether inurement has occurred is whether the
exempt organization is receiving fair value for the economic benefits it provides to
an insider. 23 Thus, inurement can occur as a result of unreasonable compensation
to an insider, 21 a below market interest rate loan to an insider, 2 below market rent

17
18

Id. at 1070.
Id

'9 Id at 1071.
2 See also Lowry Hosp. Assoc. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 850, 859 (1976) (stating that where a doctor
or group of doctors dominate the affairs of a hospital close scrutiny of its exempt status is required).
21 Harding Hosp., Inc., 505 F.2d at 1072.
22

IRS, ExEMirt ORGANIZATONS HANDBOOK § 381.1.

23

See World Family Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 958, 969-70 (1983).
See, e.g., Birmingham Business College, Inc. v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1960);
Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1953); World Family Corp., 81 T.C. 958;
People of God Community v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 127 (1980); Saint Germain Found. v. Commissioner,
26 T.C. 648 (1956); Alive Fellowship of Harmonious Living v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1134
(1984).
25 Orange County Agric. Soy v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1602 (1988), affd, 893 F.2d 529
(2d Cir. 1990); John Marshall Law School v. United States, 81-2 U.S.T.C. 87,684 (CCH) 1 9514 (Ct. Cl.
1981); Unitary Mission Church of Long Island v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 507 (1980); Lowry Hosp. Assoc. v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 850 (1976).
24
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paid by an insider,6 and the organization's furnishing of goods and services to an
27
insider for no consideration.
Contingent Compensation
A most difficult situation for determining whether an exempt organization is
receiving fair value for the economic benefits it provides is the payment of
contingent compensation. There have been three seminal court decisions
addressing the role of contingent compensation in exempt organizations and the
examination of each bears merit. The first decision, People of God Community v.
Commissioner,28 involved a newly formed church which compensated its
minister-founder and two other ministers on the basis of a percentage of gross
tithes and offerings. The base percentage for the founder was adjusted upward
annually to reflect increased personal expenses or downward to the extent that
larger receipts permitted an increase in compensation for the other ministers. No
upper limit or cap was placed on the total amount any minister could receive. 21
The Tax Court concluded that the method by which the ministers' compensation
was determined clearly showed that part of the church's earnings was paid to
private shareholders or individuals:
Whatever [the founder's] services were worth, they are not directly
related to the [church's] gross receipts; the value of solace and
spiritual leadership cannot be measured by the collection box. By
basing [the founder's] compensation upon a percentage of [the
church's] gross receipts, apparently subject to no upper limit, a
portion of [the church's] earnings is being passed on to [the
founder].30
The court, however, was careful to point out that all contingent arrangements were
not per se inurement, stating that "such arrangements are a part of business life
and must occasionally be paid by a charity to salesmen, publishers, support
groups, and even fundraisers." 3t

25 Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974); Peterson v. Commissioner, 53
T.C.M. (CCH) 235 (1987); Kenner v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239 (1974); Rev. Rul. 69-545,
1969-2 C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
27 See John Marshall Law School v. United States, 81-2 U.S.T.C. 87,684 (CCH) 9514 (Ct. CI. 1981);
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. CI. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1009 (1970).
28 75 T.C. 127 (1980).
29 Id. at 129. The percentage of tithes being paid to the founder ranged between 53% and 64% and to
all ministers between 69% and 86%.
30 Id at 132.
3' Idl at 133.
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In World Family Corp. ,3 the Tax Court began to indicate the distinction
between permissible fnd impermissible contingent compensation arrangements.
World Family Corporation was organized and operated to provide grants and
interest free loans to missionaries sent out by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints. The organization's fund-raising program involved commissions
payable to fund-raisers of up to twenty percent of the amount raised by each fundraiser. 33 The organization's balance sheet showed an account payable to its
president for an accrued commission. 34 The Service contended that the
organization's net earnings inured to the benefit of its president. The Tax Court
disagreed holding that a contingent fee arrangement made by a tax-exempt entity is
not per se unreasonable as the Service appeared to contend.35 The Tax Court
distinguished People of God Community:

[The] commissions are directly contingent on success in procuring
funds and as such are tied to services rendered. These elements
distinguish [the organization's] commission arrangement from other
arrangements found by the courts to constitute private inurement...
In [those] cases, some percentage of receipts or salary was
routinely designated for one dominant individual, and he was
entitled to receive this income whether or not he rendered services to
the payor organization. 36
37
World Family Corp. and its successor, National Foundation, Inc.,

demonstrate the primary problem caused by contingent fee arrangements.
Frequently, such arrangements may by their very nature provide compensation to
the service provider in excess of the value of the services he provides. In such
case, the Service and the courts look for protections against the possibility such
excess will be paid. In World Family Corp. the Tax Court focused on the fact that
the amount of compensation was dependent upon the accomplishment of the
objectives of the contract and was not based solely upon the incoming revenue of
the organization. 38 This fact tends to establish that the service provider is unlikely
to receive compensation in excess of the value of his services.
An added protection which insures against the likelihood of such excess is a
ceiling on the contingent compensation. The ceiling avoids the possibility of a
windfall benefit to the service provider, particularly in those instances where the
base for the contingent compensation cannot bear any relationship to the level of
32
11

World Family Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 958 (1983).
Id. at962.

34

Ig

35

Id. at 968.

36
37
38

1&at 970 (footnote omitted).
National Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 87-2 U.S.T.C. 89,827 (CCH) 1 9602 (Ct. Cl. 1987).
See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,453 (Nov. 11, 1962).
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service provided. 3 In National Foundation,Inc. v. United States,40 the Court of
Claims pointed to the existence of a ceiling on the contingent compensation
received by its fund-raisers as evidence that the earnings of the subject organization
("NFI") did not inure to the benefit of private individuals. As compensation for
soliciting donors, the fund-raisers were paid a percentage, ranging from three to six
percent, of the donations they generated. The percentage paid varied with the value
of the donation. 41 The Service argued that the fund-raisers were co-venturers with
NFI and that the compensation resulted in inurement. The Court of Claims
disagreed with the Service distinguishing NFI from the church in People of God
Community on the basis that the church had no upper limit on the percentage paid
to the minister whereas NFI's fund-raisers were subject to a six-percent upper
limit. a
The Service has issued one revenue ruling addressing the contingent
compensation arrangements of hospitals. In Revenue Ruling 69-383, 13 advice
was requested as to whether payment of contingent compensation to a radiologist
jeopardized a hospital's tax-exempt status. Under the hospital's contract with the
radiologist it was required to provide space, equipment, and supplies and to make
nonmedical personnel available to the department of radiology. The radiologist
agreed to manage the department, participate in the hospital's educational program,
and perform all radiological services required by hospital patients, employees, and
students. While the radiologist served as the professional and administrative head
of the department, he had no control over or management authority with respect to
the hospital. The hospital, with the approval of the radiologist, established the
amounts charged to patients for services rendered. The hospital billed and
collected the charges.
The hospital paid the radiologist a fixed percentage of the department's gross
billings, adjusted by an allowance for bad debts. "The amount received by the
subject radiologist [was] not excessive when compared to the amounts received by
other radiologists having similar responsibilities and handling a comparable patient
volume at other similar hospitals." 44 The Service's ruling noted that under certain
circumstances, the use of contingent compensation can constitute inurement of net
earnings to private individuals. 45 The Service ruled that no such inurement was
present based on the following factors: (1) The radiologist did not control the
organization; (2) the agreement was negotiated at arm's length; and (3) the amount

39
40
41

Id
87-2 U.S.T.C. 89,827 (CCH) 1 9602 (Ct. C. 1987).
Id. In addition, CDOs received $50 of a $100 application fee paid by donors.

'

Id. at 89,832.
1969-2 C.B. 113.

4'
'"

Id at ll4.

45

Id
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the radiologist received was reasonable in terms of the responsibilities and
activities he assumed under the contract.46
The ruling does not indicate which of these factors was the primary basis for
the holding. However, shortly after the ruling, the Service contested a hospital's
tax-exempt status based on inurement to a group of physicians, even though the
physicians were not members of the hospital's governing board. 47 So it would
seem that the Service was not relying primarily on the radiologist's lack of control.
In addition, in the ruling the Service indicated its belief that contingent
compensation, which at the time of entering a contract may be reasonable, can later
cause inurement. It would seem, therefore, that the major basis for the Service's
ruling is that the contract was negotiated at arm's length. By arm's length the ruling
does not mean the contract was negotiated fairly or aggressively among the parties,
but rather that the terms of the transaction are similar to those terms reached by
other persons" or that the nature of the contract is such that payment in excess of
reasonable compensation is unlikely to occur.
The arrangement described in the ruling was typical for pathology and
radiology departments prior to 1982.4 Accordingly, one interpretation of the ruling
may be that contingent-based compensation is proper if, at the time the contract is
entered into, its terms are consistent with others in the trade or industry. This
rationale is consistent with some of the Tax Court's comments in World Family
5
Corp. -oand People of God Community. 1
The arrangement described in Revenue Ruling 69-383 occurred as a result of
the fact that prior to 1982 hospitals usually billed on a global charge basis for both
the radiologist's professional charges as well as its own facility charge. Thus, the
percentage compensation arrangement represented an allocation of a portion of the
global charge (referred to as the "professional component") to the physician to
compensate him for his services. The hospital retained the remainder (the
"technical" or "facility component") as compensation for use of its facilities and
equipment. Because the hospital could reasonably determine the portion of each
dollar collected attributable to the efforts of the physician and correspondingly
attributable to the facilities of the hospital, the risk of unreasonable compensation
being paid was minimized. In effect, the radiologist's situation was similar to the
fund-raiser in World Family Corp. in that the radiologist's pay was dependent

46

Id

47 See Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974).
48 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(b)(1), -2(a)(2)(i) (1992).
4) See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). See also Douglas M. Mancino, Nonexempt Uses of
Tax-Exempt HospitalBonds, 24 J. HEALTH & HOsp. LAW 73, 79-80 (1991).
5D World Family Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 958, 968 (1983).
M People of God Community v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 127, 133 (1980).
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upon seeing more patients and not upon the revenue of the hospital including
departments other than radiology.
Although the previous discussion has focused on compensation for services,
it would appear that the same analysis applies to any arrangement under which an
insider receives contingent compensation directly from any exempt organization. 2
Thus, the analysis should apply to payments for the use of property or money. In
fact, in one recent private letter ruling involving the rental of equipment, the Service
has indicated that the protections described above will be required for such
payments. 2
In conclusion, when an individual is entitled to receive, in return for services
or the use of property, payments from an exempt organization which are
contingent, the payments may constitute inurement because of the possibility that
the organization may pay more than fair value for the services rendered or the
property used. In order to protect against such possibility, the courts and the
Service require the presence of one or more of the following: (1) The amounts
paid are dependent upon objectives of the contract and are not solely based on the
incoming revenue of the organization, including revenue from activities unrelated
to the contract's subject matter; (2) there is a ceiling on the amounts to be paid so as
to avoid the possibility of a windfall to the service provider; and (3) the terms of
the contract are consistent with others in the trade or industry.
Disguised Distributions
Another area of contention between the Service and exempt organizations
involves what may be called "disguised" or "hidden distributions." Frequently
exempt organizations attempt to argue that they should not be penalized for
distributing proceeds in the form of fringe benefits to insiders rather than in the
form of salaries, since the fringe benefits, when added to the salary payments,
2 See infra text accompanying notes 131-42 for a discussion of compensation received by an insider

from a partnership in which the exempt organization and insiders are partners.

0 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-24-805 (Mar. 22, 1990). In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-24-085, a hospital planned to install
and operate an MRI system. To secure financing for the system, a limited partnership was created with
individuals unaffiliated with the hospital acting as general partners. The limited partners were to be
physicians with staff privileges at the hospital. The partnership was to purchase the MRI equipment and
lease it to the hospital During the term of the proposed lease, the hospital was obligated to pay monthly

rent denominated as "basic rent." In addition to basic rent, the hospital was obligated to pay amounts

designated as "contingent rent." Contingent rent was equal to the lesser of a fixed dollar amount or
"adjusted net income" as defined in the lease. Greater use of the MRI system generally would result in a
higher adjusted income and therefore a higher contingent rent subject to the annual cap. But, critically,

the hospital was nut obligated to pay contingent rent out of cash flow from its other operations. Finally, the

hospital received the opinion of an independent appraiser that the rental arrangement was fair and
reasonable. The letter ruling held that there was no private benefit or private inurement involved in the.
arrangement due to the fact that the lease was the result of arm's length negotiations, contingent rent was
payable only out of cash flow from the system, the amount of contingent rent in any one year was capped,
and an expert had reviewed the arrangement and concluded that it was fair and reasonable.
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would have been considered reasonable compensation. If, however, such payment
is a "disguised dividend or benefit from net earnings, the character of the payment
is not changed by the fact that the recipient's salary, if increased by the amount of
the distribution or benefit, would still have been reasonable." 54 This should not
mean that an organization cannot pay benefits other than fixed salary which, when
added to such fixed salary, constitutes reasonable compensation. 5 It also should
not mean that there are payments made by an exempt organization in a fair
exchange for services or the use of property which by their nature alone constitute
inurement so long as such payments have the protections described above.
Instead, what the courts mean and what the Service has accepted is that even if a
benefit to an insider would constitute reasonable compensation, it is inurement per
se if the benefit was not reported as income to the insider before challenge of the
subject organization's exemption by the IRS. 56 In fact, the Service has specifically
recognized this failure to report as the basis for the "disguised distribution"
language: "Note that payment of personal expenses of an insider that the
organization does not characterize as compensation at the time of payment may
constitute inurement even when, if added to compensation, the total amount of
compensation would be reasonable." 57
GCM 39,862
The Chief Counsel's analysis of the sales of net revenue streams by hospitals
demonstrates the Service's continued use of overly restrictive tests and its
confusion of issues and doctrines. These malapropisms of tax doctrine are
apparent throughout the Chief Counsel's analyses of private inurement, private
benefit, and public policy.
Although it is difficult to sort out, the Chief Counsel's analysis of the private
inurement aspect of revenue stream sales falls into four parts. First, the Chief
Counsel continues to take the outrageous position that all staff physicians of a
hospital are subject to the inurement proscription. Physicians generally do not
have inside control over hospital policy, but are able to influence the hospital only
through their market power.
Except where a single small physician group
controls substantially all of a hospital's patient revenue, as in Harding Hospital,
members of the group should not be viewed as insiders. Even if a physician
group might by itself be viewed as "insiders," it is difficult to view a number of
54 John Marshall Law School v. United States, 81-2 U.S.T.C. 87,684 (CCH) 9514 (Ct. Cl. 1981);
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1009 (1970).
-5 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987).
6 See John Marshall Law School, 81-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9514; Founding Church of Scientology, 412
F.2d 1197; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-47-158 (Aug. 31, 1981).
57 IRM MT 7(10) 69-38 (Mar. 27, 1992).
58 See Theodore T. Myre, Jr., Significant Tax Issues in Hospital Related Joint Ventures, 75 KY. L.J. 559
(1986-87).
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such groups as limited partners having a single mind-set of collective self-interest
sufficient enough to constitute them as insiders. Hospital administrators will
readily admit that there is a competitive mind-set, both economically and
politically, among practice groups of a large hospital which is sufficient to prevent
any one group from exercising "control" and that rarely, if ever, do such groups at
in concert. Finally, treating all physicians as insiders is problematic, for if every
physician is an "insider," transactions with one hundred or more persons become
subject to the inurement proscription where one misstep causes revocation of
exemption.
But even if some or all physicians are insiders, the Chief Counsel's
conclusions are largely unsupportable. The second part of the Chief Counsel's
analysis is the assertion that a transfer of assets to an insider must have a charitable
purpose or the transfer constitutes inurement. Since the Chief Counsel did not
view the transfer of the revenue streams as having a charitable purpose, he states
the transfer gives rise to inurement. 50 Although People of God Community
indicated that the contingency upon which contingent compensation is based
should be related to the performance of an exempt function, subsequent decisions
expressly ruled otherwise. (0The proper analysis in any contingent payment
situation is whether the payment to be made by the exempt organization is
dependent upon the amount of consideration provided by the insider rather than
merely upon the incoming revenue of the organization. 61
This brings one to the third part of the Chief Counsel's analogy which is that
the structure of the transaction itself gives rise to inurement. Apparently, the
Service reads People of God Community as requiring that all contingent-based
compensation be treated as inurement per se. In postulating this theory, the Chief
Counsel first argues that there is no parallel between the radiologist's compensation
in Revenue Ruling 69-383 and the sale of the net revenue streams. The reason for
this conclusion is that the Chief Counsel's analysis is superficial in that there is no
in-depth search for the parallel. Part of the rationale for the acceptance of the
contingent-based compensation in Revenue Ruling 69-383 was that the hospital
was able to insulate the hospital's earnings in excess of the value of the services
received from being paid out to the radiologist. It did this by limiting the
percentage arrangement to the hospital's radiology department and by developing a
rational basis for determining the value of the radiologist's services relative to that
The Chief Counsel states: "This Office has stated 'inurement is likely to arise where the financial
benefit represents a transfer of the organization's financial resources to an individual solely by virtue of the
individual's relationship with the organization, and without regard to the accomplishment of exempt
purposes'. . . The proper starting point for our analysis of the new revenue stream arrangements is to ask
what the hospital gets in return for the benefit conferred on the physician-investors. Put another way, we
ask whether and how engaging in the transaction furthers the hospital's exempt purposes. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,862 at 20-25.
ff See World Family Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 958 (1983).
61 See supra text accompanying notes 28-53.
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of the hospital's radiology facilities. In effect, the hospital was effectively able to
isolate the hospital's other income from the radiology department and pay the
radiologist's and the hospital's share of the department's income proportionate to
their relative contributions.
It can be argued that the sale of the revenue stream does a more effective job
of isolating the physician contributions. This argument can be demonstrated by a
rough analogy. Assume that instead of selling the net revenue stream to the
hospital-physician partnership, the hospital contributes the outpatient surgery center
to the partnership in exchange for a capital interest in the partnership equal to the
value of the center's tangible assets and a profits interest consisting of a preferred
return and participation in the partnership's profits in excess of the preferred return.
The preferred return is a fixed dollar amount payable annually equal to the annual
average earnings of the surgery center. In effect the hospital is granted the
preferred return in lieu of crediting to its capital account the surgery center's
goodwill. Profits remaining after the payment of the preferred return are
distributed to the hospital-general partner and the physician-limited partners in
accordance with their opening capital accounts. The limited partners make cash
contributions to the partnership which are reinvested in refurbishing the center.
At the end of five years, because all profits have been distributed, the
partners' capital accounts are the same as their beginning accounts. The hospital
and the physicians decide to terminate the partnership. The hospital contributes an
amount of cash equal to the limited partners' capital accounts. The limited partners
receive such cash in liquidation of their interests. The hospital receives the
refurbished center in liquidation of its interest. In this situation the hospital has
isolated its current earnings from physician participation through the use of the
preferred return. The physicians' contribution (through their investment or
increased referrals) is related solely to the generation of earnings in excess of the
preferred return. The partnership has developed a rational basis for apportioning
such earnings according to the hospital's and the physicians' relative contributions.
In effect, the hospital has prevented the diversion of earnings to the physicians
without regard to the value of their participation. Thus, the hospital has avoided the
problem with contingent payment arrangements specifically described in People of
God Community and World Family Corp.
In the revenue stream situations, the hospital has merely sold the goodwill
up front rather than take it as a preferred return. In addition, rather than drop the
center into the partnership and receive it upon liquidation, the hospital has decided
to retain title to the center. Further, the physicians' cash contribution is paid directly
to the hospital for use in other health care facilities rather than invested in the
surgery center. These are the only differences in the two scenarios. Assuming the
valuation of the earnings stream is fair, the hospital has again limited the basis of
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the physicians' shares of revenue to amounts having a relationship to their efforts
in increasing the utilization of the center. In effect, the physicians have become like
the insider fund-raiser in World Family Corp. in that the compensation of each is
based on the success in raising the revenue of the exempt organization. So long as
the physicians' percentages are limited to the relative values of their efforts in
increasing utilization of the center, no inurement exists. 2 In brief, the Service
should attack the transaction either by challenging the valuation of the goodwill or
the relative percentages of the revenue stream accorded the hospital and the
physicians; but it cannot attack the transaction on the basis of the structure alone.
The transaction does not constitute inurement per se. 6
The Chief Counsel discards the applicability of Revenue Ruling 69-383 on
three different grounds. First, the Chief Counsel argues that Revenue Ruling 69 383 has no relevance because the ruling was published prior to a 1980s change in
practice in the manner in which radiologists' compensation was determined.
Second, the Chief Counsel states that the ruling dealt with compensating the
physician with revenues derived from the professional component of the facility's
or department's revenue. Since the net revenue stream situation involved solely the
facility's component, the Chief Counsel asserts that Revenue Ruling 69-383 has no
relevance. Finally, the Chief Counsel asserts that the revenue ruling is inapplicable
because it dealt with a compensation agreement rather than a joint venture. Each of
these assertions avoids the critical issue of whether the hospital has incurred a
significant risk of paying amounts which have no or little relationship to the
consideration provided to it, i.e., the referrals. Neither history, nor the source of the
revenue, nor the subject matter or structure of the transaction is relevant.
After presenting his reasons for discarding Revenue Ruling 69-383, the
Chief Counsel presents his substantive arguments for finding inurement per se.
These reasons are equally superficial and even more fallacious. First, the Chief
Counsel quotes the disguised dividend language of those cases discussed in the
immediately preceding section. Those cases held that failure to report a benefit as
compensation constitutes a disguised distribution requiring revocation under the
inurement doctrine even if such amount would constitute reasonable compensation
if properly reported. The Chief Counsel merely quotes the language and asserts
that this language supports inurement solely on the basis of structure and without
regard to the reasonableness of amount. The Chief Counsel does not, however,
explain the factual context of the quote, namely, the failure to report the benefits as
62 In this regard it should be noted that the physicians are not receiving a percentage based on their
capital invested in the Center. Instead their percentage is solely based on their efforts in raising revenue.
As such their relative percentage should be less than the physicians of the earlier example. The fund-raiser
in World Family Corp. received 20% of the revenue he raised.
6 Admittedly, this view of the transaction involves the recognition that the hospital is paying for
physician services in increasing revenue, i.e., it is paying for referrals. As such the transaction may violate
federal law but as is indicated herein such recognition means that transaction will be subject to a much

more lenient prohibition than the inurement proscription.
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compensation. In this respect, the Chief Counsel is being just as deceptive as the
organizations in those cases.6 As is indicated above, the disguised dividend

decisions were not based on structure but on failure to report.
Second, without the substantive analysis of the contingent payment
arrangement presented here, the Chief Counsel merely asserts that the arrangement
is the equivalent of paying dividends on stock. Although this is a compelling
proposition, it misses the point. The purpose of the inurement proscription is to
prevent the payment of earnings to insiders in amounts exceeding the value of the
consideration they provide. 65 As is described herein, exempt organizations may,
as general partner, form limited partnerships with insider-limited partners.
Certainly, the net profits distributions out of the partnership could be viewed as
dividends violating the inurement proscription. But the Service has lost that
argument because the limited partners are being compensated for their capital.

Assuming the basis for such compensation is rational, no inurement violation has
occurred because there has been no diversion of excess earnings to the insiders. 66
As is pointed out above, it can be persuasively argued that the hospital has limited
the ability for such excess earnings to be paid by tying physician compensation to
increased revenue. So long as there is a reasonable basis for apportioning the
hospital's share of such excess and the share attributable to physicians' efforts, no
inurement should occur. 67
PRIVATE BENEFIT AND EXEMPT PURPOSES

Under Code Section 501(c)(3), an organization must be "operated
exclusively" for tax-exempt purposes if its exemption is to be maintained.,, The
regulations provide that (1) an organization will be regarded as "operated
64 The Chief Counsel cites Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl.
1969) which first developed the disguised dividend language. The Chief Counsel does not cite John
Marshall Law School v. United States, 81-2 U.S.T.C. 87,864 (CCH) 9514 (Ct. Cl. 1981) in which the
same court stated that failure to report was the basis for its decision, nor did the Chief Counsel indicated
that the Service's upcoming hospital audit guidelines, IRM MT 7(10) 69-38 (Mar. 27, 1992), would
recognize this basis for the decisions.
w The Chief Counsel cited Maynard Hosp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1006 (1969) as support for
his theory that the transfer of net revenues from hospital departments constitutes inurement per se. In
Maynard, the physician control group acquired the hospital pharmacy and continued to use the hospital's
wholesale purchase discount. The physician sold pharmaceuticals to the hospital at a 10% markup. The
physicians claimed the markup represented compensation for services but presented evidence supporting
no basis for the compensation amount. The Tax Court had no obvious diversion basis for its ruling and did
not rule on structure alone as alleged by the Chief Counsel.
6 See infra text accompanying note 136. There may be a violation of the private benefit or
exclusivity doctrines if the hospitals form too many joint ventures with physicians.
67 The partnership should probably pay to the physicians a percentage of the amount equal to the
preferred return equivalent based on their and the hospital's relative capital contributions. However, the
remainder should be paid according to a much lower percentage allocable to the physicians than in the
subject private rulings. See supra note 62. In addition, if the Service disagreed with the apportionment
percentages applied, a cap on the physicians' earnings might be appropriate. See also supra text
accompanying note 42.
68 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1991).
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exclusively" for one or more exempt purposes if it engages in activities which
accomplish one or more exempt purposes and (2) an organization will not be so
regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of
exempt purposes. 9 As a corollary to this substantiality test, the regulations
provide that an organization is not operated exclusively for exempt purposes unless
it serves a public, rather than private, purpose. To meet this requirement, the
regulations require that the organization establish that it is not operated for the
benefit of private interests. '0
The private benefit prohibition can apply in situations under which the
private inurement proscription would not apply. Therefore, if there is inurement,
there will also be private benefit, but there can be private benefit without there
being inurement. 71 The first of the situations in which there can be private benefit
but no inurement arises from the fact that the private benefit prohibition applies to
everyone, not just insiders. 72 In addition, the private benefit prohibition may apply
to benefits provided by an exempt organization even if the organization is fully
compensated for such benefit. 73
The private benefit prohibition is intertwined with and is actually a part of the
provisions of the Code and the regulations that an organization must operate
"exclusively for exempt purposes," 74 and that an organization will not be regarded
as operating exclusively for exempt purposes if more than an insubstantial part of
75
its activities is not in furtherance of exempt purposes.
The court decisions with regard to this prohibition are confusing as to how
the private benefit doctrine is to be applied because the courts have not established
a definitive test. The Tax Court itself has frequently admitted the confusion. 16 If
any analytical framework can be derived from such cases, it begins with a
determination of whether an activity conducted by an organization has no more
than an insubstantial nonexempt purpose. In determining whether an activity has a
nonexempt purpose, the courts have given several guideposts. First, occasional or
incidental private benefits flowing from an activity will not prevent the activity
from being deemed in pursuit of exempt purposes. 7 Second, if the persons
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(i) (1992).
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(I)(ii) (1992).
American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
lU at 1069.
73 See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978).
7' I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1991).
"5 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(1) (1992).
76 See Manning Assoc. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 596 (1989); Estate of Hawaii v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 1067 (1979), affd, 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981); Christian Manner Int'l, Inc, v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
661 (1979).
77 American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989); Kentucky Bar Found., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 921 (1982).
(
7
71
72
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receiving the private benefit are not part of a "charitable class" and the private
benefit is not incidental to the public benefit provided, the activity will be in
furtherance of a nonexempt purpose. 78 Third, the determination of whether an
activity serves a nonexempt purpose apparently does not necessarily completely
hinge upon the activity's serving of private interests more than incidentally. If the
activity has a predominately commercial or business hue, it can be deemed to serve
a nonexempt purpose even though there is no identifiable non-charitable class of
private individuals benefited. "9
Once it has been determined that an activity is in furtherance of a nonexempt
purpose because the private benefits provided by such activity are not incidental to
its public benefits, one must determine whether the presence of such nonexempt
purpose will cause revocation. If an organization has some activities serving
exempt purposes and some serving nonexempt purposes, the organization does
not necessarily fail the exclusivity test because the regulations recognize and the
courts have specifically held that "exclusively" does not mean "solely." ,
However, when faced with situations involving multiple exempt and
nonexempt activities, the courts have not set forth a consistent approach for
determining when the nonexempt activities will cause the loss of exemption. The
regulations apparently require a determination of whether a more than insubstantial
part of the total activities are nonexempt. 81 This activity-by-activity approach has at
times been adopted by the Tax Court.8 Under the facts of a 1983 case, ten percent
of the organization's expenditures went to nonexempt activities. The Tax Court
found such activities to be insubstantial in relation to the organization's exempt
activities. 83 In a prior decision, the Tax Court had held that an activity which was
nonexempt and which received twenty percent of the organization's expenditures
was held to be "more than insubstantial. '"8 4 In both cases, the Tax Court stated that
it was not establishing a percentage test and that all relevant facts and
circumstances must be examined. 8

"8 American Campaign Academy, 92 T.C. 1053; Estate of Hawaii, 71 T.C. 1067; Christian Stewardship
Assistance, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1037 (1978).
"9 B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978); Fides Publishing Assoc. v. United States,
263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967); American Inst. for Economic Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934
(Ct. Ci. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963); Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800
(Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 368 US. 985 (1962).
80 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1992). See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Found.. Inc., 78 T.C. 921; Church
in Boston v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 102 (1978).
81 Treas. Reg. §§1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(1) (1992).
82 See World Family Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 959 (1983); Kentucky Bar Found., Inc., 78 T.C.
921; Church in Boston, 71 T.C. 102; Baltimore Regional Joint Health Bd. & Welfare Fund v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 554 (1978).
83 World Family Corp., 81 T.C. at 967.
84 Church in Boston, 71 T.C. at 108.
85 World Family Corp., 81 T.C. at 967 n.10; Church in Boston, 71 T.C. at 108.
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The Tax Court has also applied an overall approach in which the court will
not conduct a tally of all activities to see if more than an insubstantial part of them
have nonexempt purposes. Instead, the court will consider whether the nonexempt
objective component of activities having dual purposes is substantial, and combine
such component with other purely nonexempt objectives, to determine whether the
86
nonexempt objectives in the aggregate are substantial.
The Service appears to believe that the private benefit standard is absolute;
that is, if any activity of an organization serves a private benefit more than
incidentally, that activity in and of itself will cause revocation. According to the
Service, private benefit resulting from a particular activity must be incidental in
both a qualitative and a quantitative sense. It will be qualitatively incidental if the
benefit to the public cannot be achieved without necessarily benefiting certain
private individuals. It will be quantitatively incidental if the private benefit is
insubstantial after considering the overall public benefit resulting from the activity.
91 The absolute prohibition of these rulings is inappropriate. While it may be
appropriate to determine whether an activity serves a private purpose by applying a
test of incidentalness, a finding that the private benefit of an activity is not
incidental does not mean that exemption is lost. Instead, the exemption should be
lost only if the activity is substantial in relation to the organization's exempt
activities,88 or if the nonexempt component of such activity and the nonexempt
9
components of other activities are in the aggregate substantial.8
CharitablePurposes of Exempt Hospitals
As set forth above, an organization's exempt status depends upon whether
no more than an insubstantial part of its activities is in furtherance of nonexempt
purposes. 90 In the case of a hospital, this rule begs the question of what is as
exempt purpose. There are several generic classes of exempt purposes set forth in
Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) and the one applicable to hospitals is the
broadest: "charitable." The regulations state that the term "charitable" is used in
"its generally accepted legal sense," and includes "[r]elief of the poor and
distressed or of the underprivileged; ... lessening of the burdens of Government;
and promotion of social welfare .... 91 Although providing health care is not
specifically described in either the Code or the regulations as a charitable purpose,
the Service has long recognized that organizations providing health care may be
86 Manning Assoc. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 596 (1989); see also Aid to Artisans, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 202 (1978).
g7 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991); Gen. Couns. Mem. 29,598 (Jan. 23, 1987); Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978).
American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
8 ManningAssoc., 93 T.C. 596.
9D Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(1) (1992).
91 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(2) (1992).
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exempt if they meet certain other requirements. However, the Service did not set
forth specific standards for determining whether hospitals as health care providers
qualified for exempt status until 1956. In Revenue Ruling 56-185, the Service set
forth a number of requirements the most significant of which was that the hospital
"be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for the
services rendered . . . ."2 Thus, the Service required that a hospital not only
operate on a nonprofit basis but that it also provide more than an insubstantial
amount of uncompensated care to be recognized as tax-exempt. The standard of
substantial uncompensated care prov ed vague and difficult to apply. 1
Developments in the 1960s began to militate against continuing an absolute
requirement that hospitals provide a particular amount of uncompensated care.
Growing availability of third-party payments for hospital care, including employer
provided insurance and government programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, led
to a decline in free or subsidized care for the poor as a significant mission of many
nonprofit hospitals. 94 Recognizing these developments, in 1969 the Service set
forth new standards for exemption. Revenue Ruling 69-545 recognized the
general legal principle that promotion of health is itself a charitable purpose" and
removed the express requirement that hospitals relieve poverty by providing as
much uncompensated care as they could afford. 96 In order to quality as an exempt
purpose, the promotion of health purpose was required to satisfy a new standard,
the so-called community benefit standard. w This standard focuses on a number
of factors indicating that the operation of the organization benefits the community.
The community benefit standard requires that all relevant facts and circumstances
be weighed in each case. Rather than setting forth a list of requirements, the
revenue ruling illustrated the application of the standard by way of two
hypotheticals.
Hospital A was a private nonprofit community hospital with an open staff
policy and a board of trustees composed of prominent citizens of the community.
The hospital operated a full-time emergency room with no one needing emergency
care being denied treatment. The hospital provided inpatient care to all in the
community who were able to pay, either themselves or through third-party
reimbursement, including Medicare and Medicaid. However, indigent persons
92

Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203.
93 See Sound Health Assoc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 180 (1978), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 2; Sullivan
and Moore, supra note 11, at 67.
94 See Robert S. Bromberg, The Charitable Hospital, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 237, 238-240 (1970);
Douglas M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the Contemporary Nonprofit Hospital, 432 ST. Louis U.L.J.
1010, 1021-26 (1988); John D. Colombo, Are Associations of Doctors Tax-Exempt? Analyzing
Inconsistenciesin the Tax Exemption of Health Care Providers,9 VA. TAX REV. 469, 479 (1990).
95 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 118.
96 Id. at 119.
97 See Sound Health Assoc., 71 T.C. at 180; Bromberg, supra note 94, at 248; Mancino, supra note 94,
at 1025-26; Sullivan and Moore, supra note 11, at 67.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol9/iss1/2

18

Lucas: Hospital-Physician Relationships

HosTAL-PHysiciA

19921

RELATIONSHIPS

needing admission as inpatients ordinarily were referred to a public hospital in the
area. The hospital usually ended each year with an excess in receipts over
disbursements, applying the surplus to expansion and replacement of facilities and
equipment, amortization of indebtedness, improvement of patient care and medical
training, education, and research. 98
Hospital B was a small facility originally owned by five physicians who
sold their interests in the hospital to a nonprofit corporation for fair market value.
The new hospital's trustees continued to be predominantly the same physicians.
Only four other physicians were granted staff privileges in the new hospital's first
five years of existence, although a number of qualified physicians applied.
Admission to the hospital was restricted to patients of the staff physicians and
ordinarily was limited to those able to pay. Although the hospital operated an
emergency room (primarily for patients of its staff physicians), local ambulance
services were instructed to take emergency cases to other hospitals in the area. In
addition, the founding five doctors were permitted to lease office space in the
building at below market rates. 99
The Service began its analysis of the two hypotheticals by accepting the
proposition that the promotion of health is, in and of itself, a charitable purpose.
According to the Service, the charitable purpose is served even though certain
members of the community, such as indigent patients, are excluded from the class
served by the exempt entity, so long as the class served is "not so small that its
relief is not of benefit to the community." 100 Hospital A's operation of an
emergency room open to all and its provision of hospital care for all those able to
pay either themselves or through third parties allowed the Service to conclude that
it promoted the health of a class or persons broad enough to benefit the community
as a whole.10 1 Thus, the Service held that Hospital A was exempt under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3). 102
In analyzing Hospital B's situation, the Service shifted it focus to private
benefit. In contrast to Hospital A, which had a board of directors composed of
independent civic leaders, an open medical staff, and an active, open emergency
room, Hospital B had a board of trustees dominated by five physicians, a closed
medical staff, rental agreements with and favorable to its physician board
members, and emergency room care and hospital admissions substantially limited
to the physicians' paying patients. Accordingly, the Service held that Hospital B
did not qualify for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
98
99
10o

Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. at 117.
Id
Id at 118.

101 Id
102- Id
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In 1969, the Service issued two other rulings which recognized the changed
economic atmosphere in which nonprofit hospitals operated. In Revenue Ruling
69-464, 103 a hospital built an adjacent office building for doctors in order to
encourage members of its medical staff to maintain their practices near the
hospital. According to the ruling, the hospital established that (1) as a result of
having members of its medical staff in offices adjacent to the hospital, there was a
greater use andfuller utilization of the hospital's diagnosticfacilities and easier

patient admissions, and (2) the physical presence of the members of the medical
staff on the hospital's grounds made the services of these doctors more readily
available for outpatient and inpatient emergencies, facilitated carrying out their
every day medical duties in the hospital, made their attendance at staff meetings
easier, and served to increase their participation in the hospital's medical education
and research programs. 104 The ruling noted that while these leasing arrangements
were also a convenience to the lessees, many of the benefits were passed on to the
hospital and its patients in the form of greaterefficiency and better overall medical

care.105 The Service stated that these benefits derived by the hospital and its
patients indicated that such leases were entered into primarily for purposes that
were substantially related to the performance of hospital functions. 1°6
In Revenue Ruling 69-463,107 a hospital, through arm's length bargaining,
leased nearby office space to a physician group. Because of its physical proximity
to the hospital, the group was able to serve the outpatient needs of the hospital's
patients and essentially functioned as the outpatient department of the hospital. The
Service in its ruling stated:
The hospital has established that the presence of the group practice at
the hospital has the effect of (1) reducing hospital admissions, days
of stay and surgical rates; (2) permitting more efficient use of
existing facilities; (3) making more effective use of scarce health

manpower; (4) fulfilling the hospital's role as the health center of the
community; (5) fixing administrative responsibility in a single
group; and (6) making more effective use of the hospital facilities
for training purposes. 10
The Service held that the lease and the relationship with the physician group were
substantially related to the carrying on of the hospital's exempt function. 1°9

103
104

Rev. Rul. 69-464, 1969-2 C.B. 132.
Id. (emphasis added).

105
106
107
108
109

Id. (emphasis added).
Id
Rev. Rul. 69-463, 1969-2 C.B. 131.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id
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These 1969 revenue rulings indicated that the Service had come to accept
that the primary distinction between for profit and exempt nonprofit hospitals was
not in the nature of their operations but in the use of their proceeds. This was
reflected in the fact that the 1969 rulings recognized that an exempt hospital could
make a profit so long as it was invested in the replacement or expansion of
facilities rather than distributed to private parties 0 and that a hospital could be
operating in furtherance of its exempt purposes by attempting to maximize profits
through fuller utilization of its facilities. "' Thus, the rulings indicated a theoretical
abandonment of any argument that an activity of a health care provider serves a
nonexempt purpose because of a predominantly commercial hue 112 and focused
instead on private benefit or inurement as the central issue in determining
qualification of a health care provider for exemption. 113
With this acceptance of competitive health care as a charitable purpose, the
Service's litigation positions and rulings, both published and unpublished, with
respect to the application of the private benefit/inurement doctrines to health care
entities have not been consistent with their historical development. 114 As stated
earlier, the Chief Counsel has issued GCMs espousing principles contrary to
established precedent such as treating all physicians as insiders and in effect
treating any nonexempt activity characterized by private benefit as grounds for
revocation. 115 The Service's attempt to reach commercial practices of health care
entities by expanding private benefit/inurement rather than attacking the
commercial purposes of the entities' operation had, with one exception prior to the
issuance of GCM 39,862, primarily focused on non-hospital entities. 116 The
concepts of inurement and, for the most part, private benefit traditionally have
involved a diversion of an exempt organization's assets to or for the benefit of
private individuals. However, beginning with the Harding Hospital case, 117 the
Service litigated several cases in an attempt to expand the private inurement and
private benefit doctrines. 118
110

Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2C.B. 117.

... Rev. Rul. 69-463, 1969-2 C.B. 131, 131, 132.
112 See supra note 74.
113 See Colombo, supra note 94, at 480. See also Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94 (The Service
declared exempt a hospital which did not have an open emergency room because state health authorities
had declared that the operation of an emergency room would unnecessarily duplicate existing facilities
provided elsewhere in the community. The Service noted that an entity, such as a specialized hospital,
does not need an open emergency room and instead can rely on other indicia of public service such as a
board of directors drawn from the community, an open staff policy, treatment of medicare/medicaid
patients and the application of surplus funds for such things as improved facilities and equipment). Cf
County Bd. of Equilization v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) (State court
noted that hospitals exempt from federal income tax have no relevant distinctions from for-profit
hospitals).
114 Colombo, supra note 94 at 482.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 11 and 12.
116 Colombo, supra note 94, at 482.
117 Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974).
118 Colombo, supra note 94, at 485.
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In Harding, the Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of revocation of exemption
because the court could not conclude that the hospital was organized and operated
exclusively for exempt purposes or that no part of its net earnings inured to the
benefit of private individuals. 119 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on a
number of factors, none of which was viewed by the court as conclusive. The case
is notable not so much for the factors relied upon by the court but for the factors
asserted by the Service that were rejected. The Service argued that the hospital's
exemption should be revoked because had the hospital's facilities not been available
to the physician group, the group would not have been able to practice its special
type of psychiatric therapy. 120 Second, the Service contended that the hospital's
special type of treatment acted as a de facto limitation on the staff of the hospital. 121
These arguments' implication that private benefit or private inurement exists
simply because the doctors needed a hospital in which to practice indicates the
lengths to which the Service will go to extend these concepts. In the Service's
mind, the commercial needs of a specialized hospital to have specialized physicians
became a reason for applying the private benefit doctrine.
The Service's attempt to classify the newfound commercialism allowed by
the 1969 rulings as private benefit inurement was even more obvious in three nonhospital cases litigated in the 1970s and early 1980s. In each case, the Service
denied a § 501(c)(3) exemption for a practice group of physicians associated with a
medical school hospital. 122 The last of these decisions, University of Maryland
Physicians, P.A. ,123 accurately reflects the Tax Court's rejection of the Service's
arguments in each case. In Maryland Physicians, the subject organization was the
incorporation of the University of Maryland Medical School's cardiology,
nephrology, pulmonary diseases, and nuclear medicine departments. 124 All
physicians who were part of these departments were employees of the subject
organization. Substantially all of the organization's financial support came from
fees for medical care performed by the physicians at the University hospital. 25
The fees collected were paid out first for the overhead costs of the practice second
to supplement each faculty member's Medical School salary, and the remainder
was apportioned between the Medical School and bonuses set aside for faculty
members.

119

HardingHosp., Inc., 505 F. 2d at 1077.

120 Id. at 1076. The therapy was a nontraditional psychiatric therapy called "Milieu therapy."
121

id

122 See University of Md. Physicians, P.A. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 732 (1981); University
of Mass. Medical Sch. Group Practice v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1299 (1980); BHW Anesthesia Found.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 681 (1979).
123 University of Md. Physicians, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 732 (1981).

124

I

125

Id. Approximately 25% of the billable value of the services performed by the physicians was

rendered to patients who were unable to pay and were not required to pay for such services.
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The Service argued that the organization was merely a billing entity serving
the private interests of the physician employees. The Tax Court, as in the previous
two cases, rejected this conversion of a commercialism argument, now bankrupt in
precedent, into a private benefit one:
[R]espondent's argument that petitioner is primarily a billing entity
really proves nothing at all. It is true one of the petitioner's functions
is to collect fees from patients and their insurers. However, there is
nothing inherently commercial about billing as such. The Hospital,
the Medical School and the University each bill for the services they
provide, but this has little bearing on whether or not they are
operated for profit . . . The relevant inquiry concerns how the
26
money is raised and how it is spent.
The Court held that the money raised was spent for the provision of health
care in that there was no inappropriate diversion of earnings or assets to the private
benefit of the physicians. Since the money was raised through the provision of
health care and since excess earnings were reinvested in the provision of health
care, the fact that the organization performed a commercial activity (i.e., billing and
collection) necessary to both is irrelevant. Despite these losses, the Service
continued to allege that billing and collection activities incidental to the provision of
health care by non-hospital organizations lead to improper private benefit. 127 In
GCM 39,862 the Service has extended this bankrupt commercialism argument in
the guise of private benefit to attempts by hospitals to increase health services
revenue. 12
ParticipationIn Joint Ventures
Prior to 1980, the Service took the position that the mere entering into a
partnership as general partner was sufficient cause to revoke an organization's
exemption. 1 29 It was unclear, however, whether the Service viewed such
transactions inurement per se or whether it took the position that the private benefit
inherent in the transaction was always sufficient to require revocation. t3°

126

id

127 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,894 (Sept. 9, 1982).
128 See infra text accompanying notes 143 to 151.
129 See Gen. Couns. Mer. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
130 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113, in which the Service stated that compensation based
on a percentage of earnings would constitute inurement if the arrangement transformed the principal
activity of the organization into a joint venture between it and a group of physicians. The use of the term
"principal activity" indicates a recognition that the entrance of an exempt entity into a partnership is under
most circumstances a private benefit or exclusivity issue. Contrastively, the Service's inference that
entering into a joint venture constitutes inurement indicates the Service at that time believed such
ventures were inurement per se.
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The Service contended in Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. 131 that entering
into a joint venture coristituted inurement per se. This contention as well as others
advanced by the Service were disregarded by the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit
32
Court of Appeals.1
In Plumstead, the subject organization was a nonprofit corporation formed
to promote and foster the performing arts, particularly by presenting professional
productions of the classical theatre, both ancient and contemporary, performing
workshops for playwrights, and establishing a fund to assist new and established
playwrights in writing new plays for the organization to produce. In October of
1977, the Service issued a tentative adverse ruling letter to the organization holding
it had a substantial commercial purpose evidenced by the fact that locales for its
plays were only in cities where there could be guarantees of subscriptions and that
only paid professionals (actors, directors, etc.) were to be used. 133 After the protest
was filed, the organization had difficulty raising capital for its first production.
Working under time constraints imposed by the Kennedy Center, the organization,
as general partner, entered into a limited partnership arrangement with a
corporation and two individuals, none of which were insiders or related to insiders.
The organization contributed its rights to the play and the other partners contributed
cash in exchange for their respective share of profits and losses arising from the
production.
On the basis of the okontinuing commerciality and the newly formed
partnership, the Service issued a final adverse ruling to the organization on July 31,
1978. The ruling alleged three grounds: (1) The organization was a commercial
theatre organization and accordingly was not operated for substantially charitable
purposes; (2) the arrangement providing for the partnership served to promote the
interests of the limited partners, contrary to the regulations; and (3) the earnings of
the organization inured to the benefit of private individuals as shareholders. 134 The
135
Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit rejected all of these arguments.
The Tax Court and Ninth Circuit opinions provided the following guiding
principles:

131

Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), afftd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir.

1982).
132

id

133

Opening Br. of Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Docket 12139-78X, at

12, before the Tax Court. See Plumstead Theatre Soc'y. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324. See also William J.
Lehrfield, Charities and Partnerships:A Many Faceted Issue, 44 N.Y.U. TAx INST. Ch. 39, at 39-25 (1986).
134 Opening Br. of Commissioner, supra note 133, at 20. See Plumstead Theatre Socy, 74 T.C. at 1328
11.3.

135

PlumsteadTheatre Soc'y, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff't 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
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(1) The charity must control its own operations without regard to
the contractual or other opportunities provided the other partners by
the partnership;
(2) The other partners' role may only be with respect to the specific
project in the partnership and no profit may accrue to the other
partners outside the project from other money-making programs of
the charity;
(3) The other partners should not be officers or directors of the
exempt organization so as to be on both sides of the same
transaction, creating a conflict of interest and requiring further
evaluation of the bona fides of the arrangement;
(4) The value of the ownership interests in the partnership of
partners (including a share in profits or losses) must not be
disproportionate to the value of their contributions in exchange
therefor,
(5) The partnership agreement has specific protections and
reservations with respect to the degree of involvement in the general
operations of the charity of other partners; 136
(6) The entering into a single joint venture one or more of whose
purposes are nonexempt does not require revocation of the
organization's exemption, but instead one must examine all of the
organization's activities and purposes to determine whether the
organization violates the exclusivity test; 137
(7) The purpose of the joint venture may be an exempt one even
1 38
though it possesses a commercial hue.
Soon after Plumstead, the Service recognized that, with its ever expanding
view of who constituted an insider, it could not prohibit insiders from becoming
partners in joint ventures with exempt organizations. In GCM 39,444, the Chief
Counsel addressed the noneconomic role of insiders in partnerships. 139 The Chief
Counsel found that there was no absolute prohibition on insiders' of the exempt
general partner being limited partners as long as there are constraints in the
arrangement which assures that the partnership acts for exempt purposes.
136
137
138
139

See Lehrfield, supra note 133, at 39-29.
Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, 74 T.C. at 1333-34.

d

Gen. Couns. Mern. 39,444 (Nov. 13, 1985).
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With the elimination of any absolute prohibition on the participation in
partnerships by insiders, the Service has synthesized the Plumstead guidelines set
forth above into a three-prong test. The Service holds that
the initial focus should be on [(1)] whether the partnership is serving
a charitable purpose. Once a charitable purpose is established, the
partnership... should be examined [not only (2)] to assure that the
arrangement permits the exempt organization to act primarily in
furtherance of exempt purposes . . . [but also to determine (3)
whether] the benefits received by the private investors are incidental
to the public purposes served by the partnership and whether the
return which the investors may earn is reasonable considering the
amount of their investment, its duration and the degree of risk. 140
As to what constitutes a charitable purpose for a partnership with physicians,
the author has found several rulings, other than those discussed in GCM 39,862
which have specifically recognized the newfound commercialism of the 1969
rulings as an appropriate charitable purpose. In each of these rulings the hospital
transferred an existing outpatient surgery center, and in one case an entire hospital
facility, to a limited partnership between the hospital or its affiliate as general
partner and its staff physicians as limited partners. In each ruling, the Service has
recognized one or more of the following rationales as sufficient bases to hold that
the transfer and partnership involvement by the hospital were in furtherance of its
exempt purposes: (1) retention of existing staff physicians who might otherwise
be recruited by other hospitals; (2) the attraction of new physicians; (3) increase of
the hospital's efficiency through fuller utilization of existing facilities; (4) increased
usage of the facility by providing physicians an opportunity to acquire an equity
interest in the facility; (5) increased hospital cash flow because of greater utilization
of the transferred facility; (6) retention of the hospital's current market share of
services in order to support expanded services; (7) discouraging the construction of
physician-owned facilities which could reduce utilization of hospital facilities; and
(8) encouragement of physicians to maintain their current level of admissions of
141
patients requiring inpatient care at the hospital.
These rulings illustrate the commercial reality of hospitals. In order for
hospitals to provide improved health care in an increasingly more technical medical
world, they must increase and retain their revenue shares. In order to do so they
140 See Alan J. Yanowitz & Elizabeth A. Purcell, Using the Investment Partnership as a Charitable
Activity, 60 J. lX'N, 214, 216 (1984).
141 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-07-012 (Oct. 28, 1987) (explicit recognition-ambulatory surgery center);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-38-131 (June 30, 1986) (explicit recognition - outpatient surgery center); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
90-29-034 (Apr. 23, 1990) (implicit recognition - entire hospital); and Priv. Litr. Rul. 89-36-077 (June 19,
1989) (implicit recognition - outpatient surgery). See also Priv. Lit. Rul. 87-52-051 (Sept. 30, 1987)
(creation of radiology diagnostic facility to attract and retain physicians).
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must maintain relationships with physicians so that those physicians' patients will
continue to provide revenue for the hospital. This so-called physician bonding is
the flip side of billing and collection which has been specifically recognized as an
activity substantially related to the promotion of health. 142 In order to reinvest
patient revenues into improve health care, health care providers must collect these
revenues. Correspondingly, in order to provide improved health care, hospitals
must create patient revenue. Both the collection and the creation may have
commercial hues but their purpose is substantially related to the promotion of
health.
With regard to the second part of the test, the protections regarding control
of the exempt organization's participation by insiders described in GCM 39,444
assure that the first part of the text (i.e., charitable purpose) will continue to be
satisfied.
The third part of the test is the Service's qualitative-quantitative analysis for
determining private benefit. The third part is significant in that it does not reflect an
inurement analysis once the partnershipventure is operational. This absence
aligns with the fact that two of the Plumstead guidelines were that (1) no profits
accrue to the private partners outside the partnership's activities from other money making programs of the charity and (2) the value of all partners' ownership
interests in the partnership must not be disproportionate to the value of their
contributions in exchange therefor.
Apparently, the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit believed and the IRS has
accepted the view that only the private benefit doctrine should apply to the
allocation of profits in partnerships between exempt organizations and insiders.
The rationale for this view is probably that such partnerships, unlike contingent
compensation or contingent rent do not involve the direct diversion of the exempt
organization's earnings to the insider but instead involve merely the indirect use of
such assets through the partnership. A direct division of earnings would occur
only if the value of the private parties' contribution upon admission to the
partnership are obviously less than the value of the partnership interests they have
received.
GCM 39,862
As the discussion above reveals, there are two possible reasons for
concluding that the inurement doctrine is inapplicable to the net revenue stream
sales. First, the physicians might not be insiders. Second, the transaction does not
involve the direct transfer of the hospital's earnings but instead constitutes merely

142

See supra note 122.
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the usage of the hospital's assets by the hospital-physician partnerships. As has
been indicated by the Service and the courts, such usage may only be subject to the
private benefit prohibition. 143
Recall the two examples provided in the inurement discussion. In the first
example, the hospital transferred its existing outpatient surgery center into the
partnership in exchange for a capital interest equal to the value of the center's
tangible assets and a profits interest consisting of a preferred return and
participation in the excess earnings. The hospital shares in such excess with the
physicians on the basis of their relative capital contributions. The distribution of
such excess earnings can be viewed as constituting merely the equitable usage of
the capital by the parties. If the hospital received a lesser share of such excess, it
could be argued that there is no direct diversion of earnings since the preferred
return compensates the hospital for present earnings. Instead, there is only an
inequitable usage of capital. Similarly, the up-front payment of fair value for the
revenue stream may avoid direct diversion of earnings. In such case, the excess
earnings allocation becomes a question of whether the usage of the capital
contributed by the hospital and the usage of physician referral services are
apportioned equitably. If they are apportioned equitably, it is unlikely that the
application of the private benefit doctrine would cause revocation of exemption. If
they are not apportioned equitably, the application of the doctrine may cause
revocation.
As to the application of the doctrine, the Chief Counsel's analysis continues
two gross misapplications even though the conclusion he reaches is likely correct.
First, the Chief Counsel now states absolutely rather than by implication that "even
though exemption of the entire organization may be at stake, the private benefit
conferred by an activity is balanced only against the public benefit conferred by that
activity or arrangement, not the overall good accomplished by the organization. "144
As stated earlier, the private benefit doctrine is part of the exclusivity test, whose
application was described by the Tax Court in American Campaign Academy, 145 as
follows:
[S]hould [the organization] be shown to benefit private interests, it
will be deemed to further a non-exempt purpose ... This non exempt purpose will prevent [the organization] from operating
primarily for exempt purposes absent a showing that no more than
143 See supra text accompanying notes 140 to 142.
See also Sonora Community Hosp. v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 519 (1966) (An independent laboratory used hospital space rent free and directed
one third of the profits from the lab to the hospital's controlling physicians. The Tax Court held the hospital

was not operated exclusively for exempt purposes presumably on the basis of the private benefit to the
physicians).
144 Gen. Couns. Mere. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
145 American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
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an insubstantial part of its activities further the private interests or
any other non-exempt purposes.146
Even though the court may conduct an examination of the exempt
organization's purposes rather than its activities, in applying the exclusivity test, the
court will still examine the activities of the organization as a whole to determine
whether the nonexempt objectives of the organization are substantial. 147
The Chief Counsel also continues the Service's attempts to restrict the
commercial aspects of exempt hospitals' operations. As noted earlier, frequently
when the Service sees a method of operation of an exempt health care entity which
resembles that of for profit counterparts it asserts that the organization is not
operated for exempt purposes. Since 1969, the Service has substantially
recognized that the major distinction between exempt hospitals and their for profit
counterparts is that an exempt hospital's net revenue is reinvested in expanding
health care services. In GCM 39,862, the Chief Counsel recognizes this fact but
does not carry it to its logical conclusion. The GCM implies that only the
reinvestment is a charitable purpose by emphasizing only the following as
charitable purposes: (1) creation of a new provider; (2) expansion of health care
resources; (3) improvement in treatment modalities; (4) reduction in health care
costs; and (5) improved patient convenience and access to physicians.
However, in order to raise the revenue for reinvestment the hospital must
maintain its financial health and increase its market share. The Chief Counsel
concludes that increasing market share or maintaining financial health by bonding
with physicians does not constitute a charitable purpose. This conclusion makes
no rational sense. Although such a purpose may not carry as much weight to be
balanced against the benefit to private physicians as the creation of a new provider,
it should constitute a charitable purpose. In essence, the Chief Counsel is
questioning the transfer of any activity of an exempt hospital to a partnership in
order to create the increased revenue necessary to maintain the activity. This
questioning goes against many of the Service's previous rulings and the holding of
Plumstead, which held that the theater society therein could transfer an existing
play in order to maintain the play's financial health. In addition to his denying of
the Plumstead rationale and all of the other cases recognizing that in the health care
arena the raising and collecting of revenue cannot be separated from its
reinvestment, the Chief Counsel specifically disavows attracting business as an
important basis for Revenue Ruling 69-464. In doing so, the Service continues its
denial of the relationship between the commercial side of health care and the
exempt purpose of investing in health care facilities.

146
147

Id at 1066.

Manning Assoc. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 596 (1989).
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The GCM 39,862 concludes that the limited partners received a substantial
benefit from the transacions and implies that such benefit exceeded the value of
their contributions. Although the Chief Counsel's feelings as to the countervailing
weight to be afforded the hospitals' financial health purposes are probably
misguided, his belief that the financial benefits afforded the physicians were
substantial has merit. In two of the rulings the limited partners acquired fifty
percent of the partnership's profits and in the third ruling ninety percent. The
hospital or an affiliate acquired the remaining interest in profits or losses. It is
assumed that the partners made cash capital contributions in proportion to their
percentage interests and that such cash was used to pay for the revenue stream.
The revenue stream purchase was based on the assumption that the previous level
of earnings produced by the ambulatory surgery center could continue. To
apportion this amount of earnings produced according to relative contributions
toward the purchase price is appropriate assuming the discount rate and other
actuarial assumptions used were appropriate.
However, as was pointed out earlier, earnings beyond the previous or
assumed level are attributable to two factors: (1) increased usage of the hospital's
facility and (2) increased physician efforts at increasing revenues, for example, by
referrals. In apportioning these increased earnings, it would be difficult for the
hospital to argue that the relative value of referrals to the increases was ninety or
even fifty percent. The insider fund-raiser in World Family Corp. was limited to a
twenty percent commission. 48 A similar or lesser percentage for the physicians in
the earnings in excess of the assumed stream would seem more in line with
analogous contingent compensation situations. 149 Because the percentages were
alternatively fifty or ninety percent, the physicians most likely received an
impermissible private benefit in their usage of hospital facilities. Given the
magnitude of the excess percentage afforded them, it appears reasonable for the
Service to have found that the private benefit did not outweigh the exempt
purposes served. The Chief Counsel would not recognize specifically such an
analogy but implied its use when he emphasized that the earnings streams' values
were computed on the assumption that increased physician referrals would not
occur. 150

Of course, because of Medicare-Medicaid fraud, hospitals are not willing to
classify an apportionment of earnings as payment for referrals. Thus, the hospitals
in the net revenue stream rulings urged that the revenue stream sales were
analogous to loans. It is true that the net revenue stream payments up to the
amount of the assumed earnings are roughly analogous to the payment of principal
148

World Family Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 958, 962 (1983).

149 The fund-raisers in National Found., Inc. v. United States, 87-2 U.S.T.C. 89,827 (CCH) 1 9602 (Ct.
Cl. 1987), received commissions ranging between three and six percent of funds raised.
150 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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plus interest at the rate used in discounting the value of the stream. However, the
payment of the excess earnings could only be viewed as an "equity kicker." Such
equity kickers are not totally unusual in commercial financing. 151 However, to
grant an equity kicker equal to ninety or even fifty percent of profits would go far
beyond reasonable. Accordingly, the Chief Counsel's rejection of the hospital's
arm's length financing technique analogy is proper. This, plus the discussion set
forth above as to the disproportionate compensation for referrals, probably allowed
the Chief Counsel to conclude that the transaction risked revocation. However, this
does not mean that appropriate transfers of existing capabilities to or the creation of
new capabilities in a partnership with physicians cannot have as a basis for the
transfer or creation the maintenance of the hospital's financial health or an increase
in its market share.
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

Since the early 1970's, the Service has taken the position that an organization
whose activities violate public policy cannot be tax exempt. In two published
rulings, the Service held that independent private schools and churches which
operated schools that did not have a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to
students could not qualify as exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 152 The Service
based its rulings on the common law principle that all charitable trusts, educational
or otherwise, are subject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be
illegal or contrary to public policy. 153 In these rulings, the Service did not
determine whether a single non-substantial purpose of the organization which was
illegal would disqualify the organization for the exemption. In one subsequently
published ruling, the Service had the opportunity to make such a determination but
failed to do so. 154
In contrast to the published rulings, an early GCM 155 stated that if illegal acts
were a substantial part of an organization's activities, it would not qualify for
exemption. The Service in this ruling stated:
To determine when disqualifying activities... become "substantial"
...more must be considered than the ratio they bear to activities in
furtherance of exempt purposes. The quality of such acts are as
important as their quantity. A great many violations of local
pollution regulations relating to a sizable percentage of an
organization's operations would be required to disqualify it from
151
36TAx
152
153
154
155

See, e.g., Jack M. Feder, Either a Partneror LenderBe: Emerging Tax Issues in Real Estate Finance,
LAW. 191 (1983).
See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. at 158-59.
Rev. Rul, 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204.
Gen. Cours. Mer. 34,631 (Oct. 4, 1971).
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501(c)(3) exemption.
Yet, if only .01% of its activities were
directed to robbing banks, it would not be exempt. This is an
example of an act having a substantial non-exempt quality, while
lacking substantiality of amount. A very little planned violence or
terrorism would constitute "substantial" activities not in furtherance
56
of exempt purposes.1
This GCM indicates that the Service, with regard to this public policy doctrine and
its relationship to the exclusivity test, will employ an overall approach rather than
157
an activity-by-activity tally.
The courts have not indicated what type of approach they will take. The
single most important case in this area was Bob Jones University v. United
States.158 The issue in Bob Jones was whether the IRS could refuse exemption to
a private school either having racially discriminatory admission policies or
maintaining a racially discriminatory code of conduct for students. The Supreme
Court concluded that the service had such authority.
Although the Court's opinion seemed to imply that one illegal activity no
matter how substantial or insubstantial violates an organization's exemption, the
Court's opinion stated in a footnote:
In view of our conclusion that racially discriminatory private
schools violate fundamental public policy and cannot be deemed to
confer a benefit on the public, we need not decide whether an
organization providing a public benefit and otherwise meeting the
requirements of § 501(c)(3) could nevertheless be denied taxexempt status if certain of its activities violated a law or public
159
police.
Therefore, as with the general exclusivity test, there is no real indication from the
Service or the courts as to whether revocation of exemption requires that a
substantial portion of the organization's activities violate public policy or whether
one isolated activity with substantial nonexempt purposes due to its violation of
public policy constitutes sufficient reason for denial of exempt status.
GCM 39,862
Although the Chief Counsel believed that the subject transactions violated
public policy, he was unwilling to assert the violation as an absolute basis for his
156
157
158
159

Id at 12-13.
See also supra text accompanying notes 81 to 86.
461 U.S. 574 (1983), affg, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 596 n.21.
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ruling. There are two alternative reasons for such action. First, the application of
the public policy doctrine as to the number or magnitude of violations causing
revocation is ill defined. In this regard, the Service covered at length the law
discussed above and the Chief Counsel essentially reaches this conclusion.
Second, and the more likely basis, is that what constitutes a violation has not been
defined.
The Medicareand MedicaidAnti-Fraud andAbuse Law
The public policy at issue is contained in a portion of the Social Security Act
called the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Law and is commonly
referred to as the "anti-kickback" statute. This law prohibits the knowing and
willful offer, solicitation, payment, or receipt of any remuneration, in cash or in
kind, in return for or to induce the referral of a patient for any service that may be
paid for by Medicare or Medicaid. 160 Nearly every exempt hospital participates in
the Medicare and Medicaid programs and is therefore subject to the prohibition.
The Department of Justice and the Office of Inspector General ("OIG") of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") share responsibility
for enforcing the anti-kickback statute. Both agencies have agreed that neither has
authority to issue advisory opinions regarding the statute and the OIG has stated
that the requirement of scienter in the statute would make meaningful advisory
opinions almost impossible. 1 61 In addition, there have been few court or
administrative decisions interpreting the statute. 162 Finally, unlike the situation of a
school which adopts a discriminatory admission policy, a hospital is highly
unlikely to state expressly that referrals are a basis for its entering into a
partnership. Thus, the public policy doctrine is difficult, if not impossible, to apply
without an expression of a violation by the agencies responsible for the policy's
application. Accordingly, the Chief Counsel refused to issue an opinion as to
whether the statute had been violated and thus, although he believed that a violation
had occurred, refused to recommend revocation on that basis. Nevertheless, his
discussion of the anti-kickback statute provides an illustrative backdrop to his
inurement and private benefit decisions.
As is pointed out in the GCM, the ownership of almost any interest in a joint
venture gives the owner an incentive to refer business to that entity. The question
is at what point does the distribution of profits to a physician-owner constitute a
payment to induce such referral. In order to help identify these situations where
160 Social Security Act § 1128B(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-1327b(b) (West Supp. 1990).
161 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,959 (July 29, 1991) (to be codified at 4 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)(2)).
162 See, e.g, United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bay State
Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20 (st Cir. 1989); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); Inspector Gen. v. Hanlester Network, HHS Departmental
Appeals Board Dec. No. 1275 (Sept. 18, 1991 ).
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the intent may be present, the OIG released a "Special Fraud Alert--Joint Venture
Arrangements" in 1989. There are three factors indicating a joint venture may be
suspect: (1) Investors are admitted or terminated as partners based on their ability
to make referrals; (2) the venture is merely a shell, that is, one party is already
involved in the activity that is the subject of the venture and continues to undertake
most or all of the activity; and (3) the amount of capital invested by the physicians
may be disproportionately small and the returns on investment disproportionately
large. In addition, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board (the "DAB") has stated
in one famous decision that "in the ownership setting, an illegal inducement may
consist of an opportunity to earn money on an investment, if a non-incidental
purpose of providing that opportunity is to induce referrals" and that remuneration
offered or paid which exceeds the reasonable value of any investment made is
163
likely intended as an inducement for referrals.
CONCLUSION

These pronouncements by the OIG and HHS have had a very strong
influence on the Chief Counsel's inurement and private benefit assertions. First,
the Chief Counsel is determined to make the payment for referrals, whether
directly or indirectly through a joint venture, a violation of the inurement
proscription. He does this by holding that the apportionment of any venture's
earnings, not only as explicit but also as implicit compensation for referrals, is
inurement per se. Thus, the Chief Counsel has apparently concluded that
remuneration to a physician which may exceed the value of his investment is
inurement per se and causes revocation. As was discussed herein, this conclusion
is wrong. Furthermore, it is much bolder than the DAB's conclusion that
remuneration to a physician which actually exceeds the value of his investment is
likely intended as an inducement for referrals. In effect, the Chief Counsel's
inurement analysis is an effort by him to be the strong arm for HHS and the 0IG,
a role which he himself admits is inappropriate. Yet if the Chief Counsel were to
rely on the public policy doctrine for support, he realizes that his argument would
be subject to a balancing of activities and purposes to determine whether the
particular violation is substantial enough to require revocation. This is a task he is
apparently unwilling to take on as is pointed out in the GCM:
The harmful effects of selling the net revenue stream from just one
department may appear limited, but once the first such transactions
gain approval, they might be difficult to contain. It could prove
difficult to establish a distinction between syndicating the revenue
164
stream from 4 percent of a hospital's activities and 49 percent.

163
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Hanlester Network, HHS departmental Appeals Board Dec. No. 1275 at 37, 55.
Gen. Couns. Mern. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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Like it or not, the application of an uncertain substantiality test is what is
required of the Service and a hospital's tax advisors. If this uncertainty makes tax
planning and tax administration cumbersome, the proper solution is for Congress
to create a more definitive test as it has in the tax-exempt lobbying area 165 or to
166
create lesser sanctions as it has with respect to private foundations.
The OIG and HHS pronouncements also significantly influence the Chief
Counsel's private benefit analysis. Here again, the Chief Counsel attempts to align
the anti-kickback statute with tax doctrine by avoiding any required balancing of
exempt and nonexempt purposes. The Chief Counsel attempts to remove the
required balancing of the private benefit standard by stating that a hospital's
encouraging of fuller utilization of its facilities cannot be an exempt purpose. If the
Chief Counsel is successful in this assertion, then the transfer of an existing facility
to a hospital-physician joint venture will likely never satisfy the requirement that
the private benefit be incidental to the public benefit conferred by the activity
because there will be no exempt purpose to balance against the private benefit to
the physician-investors. The Chief Counsel's longstanding but incorrect second
position that any activity having a substantial private benefit causes revocation of
tax-exempt status will then mean that any such transfer will cause -revocation. This
absolutism is much bolder than the HHS and the OIG's position that the existing
involvement of one party in the activity that is the subject of the venture, coupled
with that person's continued undertaking of most or all of the activity, may violate
the anti-kickback statute. Again, by stretching a tax doctrine unrelated to the antikickback statute, the Chief Counsel is attempting to be the strong arm for HHS and
the OIG. It is also bolder than the DAB's pronouncement that an illegal
inducement may consist of an opportunity to earn money on an investment if a
non-incidental purpose of providing the opportunity is to induce referrals.
Using the private benefit doctrine as a mechanism to enforce the antikickback statute is just as inappropriate as so using private inurement. The Chief
Counsel's attempt to align exempt purposes and purposes permissible under the
anti-kickback statute is clearly overkill. Hospitals clearly may engage in conduct
which is primarily intended to maintain their financial health. Such conduct in and
of itself has an exempt purpose. If this conduct violates public policy, the proper
analysis is under the public policy doctrine. The private benefit doctrine's
application solely relates to whether such exempt purpose is counterbalanced by a
private purpose. The Chief Counsel's fear that a majority of a hospital's activities
would be conducted in joint ventures is misplaced. If this were to occur, it is likely
that the exclusivity test and the holding of Plumsteadwould require revocation.

165
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I.R.C. § 501(h) (1991).
I.R.C. § 4940 et seq. (1991).
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In the cases which were the subject of the ruling, the private benefit was
clearly overwhelming. If tax advisors desire to attack some of the less defensible
positions of the GCM, they should keep in mind the pitfalls of being too greedy.
Inevitably, some hospitals will feel compelled to transfer an existing facility into
joint ventures with physicians in order to increase that facility's utilization. In
doing so, tax advisors should keep several things in mind.
First, the entire facility should be transferred, not just the revenue stream.
Although the author believes such a transfer could be structured to avoid inurement
and private benefit, similar benefits to the hospital can be received by transferring
the entire physical facility since :transfer of the entire facility may avoid a
confrontation with the Service.
Second, the physician's capital should be invested in the facility, either in
new additions or the refurbishing of the existing facility. This will allow the
hospital to present as an exempt purpose for the transfer a new or better equipped
provider. This gives the Service the opportunity to rule on this ground rather than
face the disfavored purpose of increased utilization.
Third, a less obvious lesson can be learned from the discussion herein. It
may be advisable for the hospital to be given some credit for the value of its
existing revenue stream, i.e., its goodwill in the facility. As is demonstrated
herein, a major functional problem with the transactions described in the GCM
was that the physicians received benefits from both the current level of earnings
and future increases in earnings. This was true even though their investment was
based solely on current earnings. Accordingly, practitioners may want to credit
goodwill to the hospital's capital account. In such case, all profits could be
allocated in accordance with contributed capital. Alternatively, the hospital could be
granted a preferred return roughly equal to the current average earnings. In such
case, earnings in excess of the preferred return would be apportioned in accordance
with tangible property contributed. In the latter situation, the preferred return may
provide justification for granting the physician-investors a percentage of the excess
earnings greater than their relative capital contributions. In effect, this would grant
them an increased benefit form increased usage. Again, the key here is not to be
too greedy so as to possibly subject the venture to violation of the anti-kickback
statute or the private benefit doctrine.
If such avarice can be avoided and if the amount of hospital activity in joint
ventures is limited, it is the author's view that transfers of existing hospital facilities
to hospital-physician joint ventures with the express purpose of increasing such
facilities' utilization is permissible under the private inurement and private benefit
doctrines and the anti-kickback statute.
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